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Efforts are currently under way in Cambodia to expand the population coverage of social health
protection schemes (health equity funds and voluntary insurance). Aligning the beneﬁt packages
for members of such schemes poses particular challenges in relation to the insurance component,
as the ﬁnancing of direct beneﬁts in the insurance relies largely on the collection of voluntary
premiums. This paper develops the concept of a targeted “risk-adjusted subsidy” approach to
address this issue. Data on the health-seeking behaviour of insured households from Kampong
Thom district over the course of one year (2010) are used to illustrate the concept. To retain the
currently applied community rating and set incentives for cost effectiveness in administrative
costs, as well as to avoid cream skimming (focusing on “good risks”), a risk-adjustment
mechanism is proposed that would provide ex ante subsidies to insurance schemes according to
the expected additional cost of a person joining the scheme. Although the concept is developed
using the example of Cambodia, it is equally applicable to all developing countries facing frag-
mented risk pools while aiming for universal health coverage.
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Introduction
In Cambodia, the poorest quintile of households is identiﬁed through a mechanism
implemented by the Ministry of Planning. Health-care costs for these households are covered
through “health equity funds”,1 which are government and donor funded and provide a
1 Annear et al. (2015).
targeted subsidy to the poor. These subsidies help the poor to access primary and secondary
health-care services.
Income differences between the “identiﬁed poor” (lowest quintile) and the second and
third quintiles are relatively small,2 and the probability of catastrophic health expenditure is
actually higher among the “near-poor” than those in the bottom quintile.3 Furthermore, the
Ministry of Planning’s pre-identiﬁcation process is carried out irregularly (approximately
every three years), whereas poverty is dynamic in nature. As such, the extension of social
health protection (SHP) to the near-poor is necessary if the risk of impoverishment through
ill health is to be addressed in the informal sector as a whole. Consequently, a number of
NGOs have developed not-for-proﬁt micro health insurance (MHI)4 schemes for this target
group that provide access to primary health care at public health centres as well as to
inpatient services at one or more public hospitals. In addition, all schemes cover the cost of
transportation in emergencies and most provide a funeral grant in case of death.
Previously, such schemes were established on an ad hoc basis, largely dependent on the
geographical focus of the NGO operating the scheme and the availability of donor support.
More recently, attempts have been made to integrate some insurance schemes with other
SHP mechanisms, in particular, with health equity funds.
The development of integrated SHP schemes includes efforts to align the beneﬁt package
for all members, especially in terms of direct medical beneﬁts. However, this poses particular
challenges for the MHI component of integrated schemes because the ﬁnancing of beneﬁts
for voluntary members relies largely on premiums, which, in most cases, are insufﬁcient to
meet the cost of existing beneﬁts provided by such schemes. An analysis of operational data
on members of the Social Health Protection Association5 in 2012 found that schemes were
paying an average of USD5.50 (ranging from USD4.50 to USD 8.80) for direct beneﬁts
(payments to facilities and transportation and funeral costs), against an average contribution
of USD 3.75 (ranging from USD 3.40 to USD 4.70). This resulted in an average deﬁcit of
USD 1.75 per member, even before administrative costs were taken into account (which
varied from between USD 1.30 and USD 2.00 per member).
Increasing the premium paid by members is perceived by most MHI operators to be
impractical in the current Cambodian context, where the general public’s understanding of
insurance principles, perception of public health services and associated willingness to pay
premiums pose constraints. Indeed, recent experience has shown that schemes with
premiums above USD 7.00 have been unable to attract more than 3 per cent of the target
population (e.g. in Siem Reap, Pearaing and Phnom Penh), compared with schemes
with more affordable premiums, some of which have achieved coverage of more than
2 Index Mundi (2014).
3 Ministry of Health (2012).
4 In Cambodia, not-for-proﬁt micro health insurance is often referred to as “community-based health insurance”
(CBHI). However, in international contexts, CBHI generally refers to grass-root insurance schemes owned and
run by communities, which are, by nature, usually small in scale. In Cambodia, despite the widespread use of
“CBHI” as a term, most of these schemes are run by NGOs and operate on a signiﬁcant scale with the capability
of further scaling-up their operations if resources become available. To avoid misunderstanding, the term not-
for-proﬁt micro health insurance will be used for the purposes of this paper.
5 The Social Health Protection Association (SHPA) is a membership organisation that brings together all NGO
operators of social health protection schemes across Cambodia, including every organisation running not-for-
proﬁt micro health insurance and several health equity fund implementers.
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50 per cent (e.g. in Angkor Chum). At the same time, most operators are facing severe
funding pressure, as donor ﬁnance has been decreasing while the government has yet to
articulate a clear operational vision for the expansion of SHP in the context of efforts to
achieve universal health coverage.
As such, the need to ensure that premiums remain affordable places signiﬁcant
constraints on the services that can be included within the beneﬁt package of insurance
schemes such as high-cost national-level hospital services, and speciﬁc services for
chronic diseases such as diabetes. At the same time, emerging donor priorities and the
overall Government of Cambodia SHP framework are placing increasing emphasis on the
enrolment of vulnerable individuals (such as the elderly, children, people with disabilities
and pregnant women) into schemes.6 Schemes are thus confronted with the challenge to
remain ﬁnancially viable, while ensuring that high-risk groups are covered and that
associated high-cost services are included in the beneﬁt package. Consequently, scheme
implementers have been calling for government subsidies either for, among other things,
administrative costs or to shift excess health-care costs to the government or donors ex
post.7 This, however, has met with resistance, as such approaches can distort incentives for
the effective management of scheme costs (both for administration costs and those
associated with direct beneﬁts).
As a contribution to the discussion, this paper presents an alternative approach to subsidies
—one that retains incentives for efﬁcient scheme management as well as for broad-based
enrolment efforts, including of high-risk groups. The concept is based on the notion of a
“risk-adjustment mechanism” and is designed to be suitable for countries such as Cambodia
that are moving towards universal health coverage through the development and expansion
of demand-side ﬁnancing mechanisms (such as insurance) in the presence of multiple and
fragmented risk pools.
Risk-adjustment mechanisms are used in several competitive health insurance markets to
compensate an insurer for taking on high-risk individuals. The subsidy is paid to the insurer,
not the insured, but is based on the insured’s risk proﬁle.8 This mechanism prevents insurers
from increasing the premium for such individuals or avoiding taking on the risk,9 and thus
allows for broad-based enrolment in insurance schemes in the spirit of universal health
coverage. By reducing the costs imposed by high-risk individuals to the overall pool, such
mechanisms help keep premiums at affordable levels while retaining incentives for efﬁcient
health-care production.10
Risk-adjustment models should be based on an accurate description of the risk proﬁle of
each insured, that is, on a forecast of the expected costs they would induce. A risk proﬁle
could contain information on age and gender, but also on the health history of the insured.
Reliable information on diseases—particularly in relation to the speciﬁc characteristics of
a person such as age and gender—is, however, scarce and often of low quality in the
developing world.11 But this lack of data can be circumvented by using instead easily
6 For instance, GIZ (2014).
7 SHPA (2013).
8 Van de Ven (2011).
9 Paolucci et al. (2006); Paolucci and Stoelwinder (2011).
10 Armstrong et al. (2010).
11 Byass (2009).
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observable characteristics which can provide a fair descriptor of the expected costs that an
individual might contribute to the risk pool and, hence, offer an adequate distinction
between high(er) and low(er) risk groups.12
This conceptual paper uses data from an MHI in Cambodia to illustrate the differences in
health-care utilisation cost per case and expected cost to the scheme (which would form the
basis for the risk premium) according to gender and age. Based on this illustration, a concept
is derived for provision of an ex ante subsidy to such insurance schemes, which would
reduce the costs borne by the insured, making the scheme indifferent to the risk proﬁle of
each insured, while at the same time retaining the incentive for efﬁcient operations. The
paper begins with an overview of the data used to provide insights into health-care utilisation
and the costs of insuring members in an MHI, after which the subsidy concept is presented
and the advantages of this approach explored.
Methodology: data and limitations
In order to better understand health-care utilisation and the cost of insuring members, it was
deemed helpful to use real data on health insurance claims received by MHIs in Cambodia.
However, reliable data from insurance schemes on individual members’ health-care
utilisation and related costs, as well as the age and gender of the patient, is scarce in
Cambodia. The introduction of a standardised Management Information System for all
integrated SHP schemes and MHI providers through the Ministry of Health, the roll-out of
which is currently under way, will likely improve this situation.
For the presentation of this concept, data from a single scheme operating in the Kampong
Thom “operational health district”13 were used. The data set covers the period January to
December 2010 and contains a total of 9,898 events (consisting of a combination of medical
costs along with transportation costs and payments for “safe motherhood” services) claimed
by health-care providers from the insurance scheme. The data set contains information on the
kind of provider used, the type of service received (outpatient vs inpatient) and the amount
claimed from the insurance scheme, as well as information on the age and gender of the
patient, although information on speciﬁc diseases was unreliable.
Under the MHI selected for this study, households were allowed to enrol in the scheme at
any time and for varying durations. Hence, the scheme had ﬂuctuating monthly membership
ﬁgures in 2010 ranging from 3,018 in January (lowest monthly ﬁgure) to 4,678 in June
(highest monthly ﬁgure). On average, about 1,950 males and 2,045 females were members of
the scheme. The utilisation rate was calculated on a monthly basis as a ratio of the number of
visits to health facilities (claims received by the scheme) to the total number of people
insured in that month. The monthly incidence rates were then aggregated to obtain the annual
incidence rate. The annual premium (calculated as the incidence rate times the average cost)
was also calculated in the same manner, that is, monthly pure risk premium ﬁgures calculated
and aggregated to obtain the annual premium. STATA and Excel were used for the
calculations.
12 For instance, Mahal et al. (2002) provide a compilation of studies that show how health costs increase in old
age.
13 An “operational health district” is an administrative unit in the Cambodian health system.
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An analysis of health service utilisation data revealed differences in the utilisation rate
between men and women, as well as across different age groups. Individuals enrolled in the
insurance scheme visited health centres on average 2.26 times in a year. However, the
average for men and women differed, with average rates of health service utilisation of 1.72
and 2.76 per year, respectively. Health centre utilisation by women increased at the onset of
child-bearing age; health centres in Cambodia are usually the main source of obstetric care
for women, including for actual delivery. Figure 1 illustrates the average number of visits to
a health centre by age group and for men and women.
The average hospitalisation (inpatient treatment) rate for the entire sample across all age
groups was 0.10 per year, which is high compared with earlier rates collected for health
equity funds (which were between 0.008 and 0.048 for three sample sites).14 This high
utilisation rate can be explained by adverse selection: more than half of the households that
utilised inpatient care joined the scheme in the preceding three months. Figure 2 illustrates
differences between age groups for men and women in the hospitalisation rate.
Cost of health-care utilisation
The average cost of health-care utilisation paid by the insurance scheme differs greatly
between hospitals and health centres, as can be seen in Table 1. These ﬁgures are based
on 2010 prices; however, the cost of care has increased since then. Disaggregating the
costs by age and gender has only limited value in this context, as these results need to be
























Figure 1. Outpatient (health centre+hospital) service utilisation by age and gender.
14 Noirhomme et al. (2007).
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information about the expected average costs to the insurance scheme of a person of a
speciﬁc age/gender subcategory.
Expected average cost incurred by the insurance scheme
The insurance contribution required by a scheme is a function of the severity of risk (cost)
and its frequency of occurrence. Contribution can be calculated in relation to the risk
contributed by each individual in the pool (so-called “risk-rated approach” or “risk rating”)
or across the entire risk pool, resulting in a ﬂat per capita contribution per head (so-called
“community rating”).15 Figure 3 depicts the different contribution rates for the data being
presented; differentiating the rates by age and gender results in considerable differences for
men and women for most age groups and a clear cost increase for men with age. A ﬂat
premium per head for women regardless of their age would be much higher (at around
17,896 riels) than a ﬂat premium for men (10,772 riels). From the time they enter the























Figure 2. Inpatient (hospital only) service utilisation by age and gender.
Table 1 Mean costs claimed by different facility levels
N Mean (Cambodian riels) St. Dev.
Health centre 9,044 1,668.94 8,228.36
Hospital (IPD+OPD) 854 49,906.32 51,409.27
15 Smith and Witter (2004, p. 6).
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Annual pure risk premium by age group (female)
Annual pure risk premium by age group (male)
Total female premium
Total male premium
Figure 3. Annual pure risk premium (outpatient+inpatient) by gender and age group.
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women into a single curve depicting the increasing cost with age even more clearly.
A regression was used to explain the expected cost of an individual (premium) through age
and gender categories (along with variables to include the age and gender interaction effect),
and an F-test on the regression coefﬁcients conﬁrmed a statistically signiﬁcant difference
(Prob>F=0.0285). Further testing on the speciﬁc effects of age categories revealed a
statistically signiﬁcant difference at 0.1 threshold value (Prob>F=0.0827). The difference
across age groups in females was observed to be similar to males.
In addition to these ﬁndings based on the existing basic package of services, as the
2010 STEPS report16 suggests, a similar relationship exists between age and the
incidence of major chronic diseases (high blood pressure, diabetes and high cholesterol).
Hence, if high cost services for chronic diseases currently excluded from the beneﬁt
package were taken into account, the general trends illustrated above would remain
similar, but the overall costs for older groups would be even higher. Figure 5 illustrates
this point conceptually, as the insurance data set and the data used in the STEPS Report
could not be combined.
An approach for enhancing the inclusion of vulnerable and high-risk groups
The data show that differences in the expected costs incurred by an insurance scheme can be








































Figure 5. Annual risk premium across age groups (ﬁgures used are hypothetical), including chronic care.
16 Sophal et al. (2010); the STEPS Non-communicable Disease Risk Factor Survey is part of the STEPwise
approach to surveillance (STEPS) Adult Risk Factor Surveillance project by the World Health Organization
(WHO).
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easily observable characteristics can be an advantage, particularly where data in the health
sector are weak or unreliable.
In all Cambodian MHI schemes, as with most health insurance schemes that focus on the
informal sector, a community rating is applied to ensure all members have access to the scheme at
the same cost. Although this is desirable from a social point of view, it poses an economic
challenge for the insurance scheme: the insurance product is more attractive to those individuals
with average expected health costs higher than the per capita contribution—and household
enrolment is not always fully enforced, also because reliable records on household composition
are often not available. The phenomenon of attracting above-average risks is called “adverse
selection”.17 Although, from a social point of view, this might be desirable, as it helps to ensure
that the most vulnerable households are protected and increases access to health care for those
who are most likely to need it,18 over-representation of higher-risk subgroups increases the
ﬁnancial instability of insurance schemes and may even lead to a counter-reaction in which
schemes aim to reduce the participation of such higher-risk groups (so-called “cream
skimming”19). In reality, both of these phenomena are undesirable, particularly when—as in the
case of Cambodia—MHI is an integrated component of SHP schemes, which are meant to
constitute a stepping stone towards comprehensive universal health coverage, as outlined above.
To avoid such an undesirable development, a mechanism could be introduced at the national
level that applies a risk-adjustment logic19 and is, at least to begin with, fully funded by the
government, donors or both. This mechanism would provide ex ante subsidies based on the
expected additional cost (risk) that a person joining the insurance scheme constitutes to the risk
pool beyond a set threshold. This risk-adjusted subsidy mechanism could eventually be
institutionally anchored in a dedicated SHP agency or fund at the national level, as is currently
being discussed in Cambodia.20 The SHP schemes would submit their MHI membership
information at set intervals to the risk-adjusted subsidy fund at the national agency and receive
an ex ante subsidy payment in return.
The subsidy payable for each person covered by MHI can be calculated using the
following formula:
Si ¼ Costi + SMi +Aj  Cj;
where Si is the subsidy payment for the speciﬁc individual (i) in question with Si⩾ 0, and
Costi is the pure risk premium (i.e. expected cost) of the speciﬁc individual, SMi a security
margin (i.e. mark up on the pure risk premium to account for stochastic variations in the
expected costs), Aj the administrative cost per person (which is not strictly dependent on
the personal characteristics of an insured indicated with subscript j) and Cj a ﬁxed
contribution payable per person regardless of their speciﬁc risk proﬁle (age, gender).
Cj can be politically deﬁned in line with current discussions based on the draft Health
Financing Policy, which envisages the use of general government revenue or earmarked
taxes to subsidise the enrolment of the informal sector in a “National Social Health
Protection Fund”.20
17 See, for example, Akerlof (1970); van de Ven and Ellis (2000).
18 For a review of the potential impact of micro health insurance, see Radermacher et al. (2012).
19 Van de Ven and Ellis (2000).
20 Ministry of Health (2013).
The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance—Issues and Practice
252
Costi is mainly deﬁned by the health-care beneﬁts covered by the MHI. Currently,
beneﬁt packages for MHI vary by scheme and differ from the standard beneﬁt package for
health equity funds, especially in terms of access to higher-level hospital services.
In the future, the intention is to mandate a minimum beneﬁt package for all members of
integrated SHP schemes, including those covered by MHI, and this decision will rest with
the government as the main source of subsidies to schemes (i.e. in deﬁning the essential
beneﬁt package, as discussed in the current draft Health Financing Policy). Beyond this, it
is mainly a function of the characteristics of age and gender, as illustrated above. However,
costs will also differ by location due to different illness patterns and the cost structure of
surrounding health-care providers. Costi can, therefore, be estimated using multiple linear
regression deﬁned by the following formula:
Costi ¼ αAgei + βGenderi + γ Locationi + μi;
where α, β and γ are the regression coefﬁcients of the three characteristics, respectively
(i.e. the estimators describing the cost function based on previous claims data). Interaction
terms will be added to reﬂect the simultaneous inﬂuence of the three factors on cost. The
precision of the estimate will increase steadily over time as longer time series data become
available the longer this approach is implemented. Finally, μ is the residual error term.
With the contribution rate Cj deﬁned politically and remaining ﬂat for each person
regardless of their respective risk proﬁle (and, hence, associated expected costs) and the
security margin SMi set taking the expected deviation from the mean cost (e.g. due to the low
quality of past data) for a given conﬁdence level and potential price increases (trends) into
account, these expected costs (Costi) and the scheme’s administrative costs (Aj) deﬁne the
subsidy amount per person.
To deﬁne the administrative costs (Aj) for MHI schemes operating in different operational
health districts in Cambodia, a tendering process adapted from the one that is already applied
by the Ministry of Health for health equity funds can be used. Under this process, in order to
operate an MHI in one “cluster” of Cambodia’s 81 operational health districts (usually
between three and ﬁve districts together) and to be eligible for participation in the subsidy
mechanism, interested operators (currently NGOs) would respond to a Ministry of Health
(or the newly established SHP agency) tender with an offer specifying Aj. In line with the
integration of health equity funds and MHI activities within a single scheme and to enhance
operator efﬁciency, tenders would be for the combined cost of the operation of health equity
funds and MHIs in one cluster. However, if the proposed approach is applied only to MHIs,
Ajwould only describe the additional administrative cost of running the MHI beyond the cost
of operating the health equity fund.
Figure 6 conceptually illustrates the effect of the subsidy mechanism with a politically set
ﬂat contribution. Areas A and C are the subsidy payments to the MHI scheme. Area B is
excess income earned on low-risk insured. In a contributory risk-adjustment mechanism,
some or all of this contribution could be transferred to the risk subsidy fund. However, to
reduce the complexity of the system, it is suggested to leave this revenue with the MHI
scheme for the time being and have SHP operators use any excess income to offer a lower Aj
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in the tendering process. To ensure that a certain amount is spent on the insurance education
of the target group, minimum requirements can be deﬁned and funded.21
Advantages of the approach
The risk-adjusted subsidy approach strengthens the demand side of the health ﬁnancing
system, both with regard to services covered in a pre-paid beneﬁt package as well as the
population covered. A politically deﬁned contribution rate payable by each insured member
regardless of their risk proﬁle would enhance the affordability of the scheme, while the
extended beneﬁt package would increase its attractiveness. Both aspects are likely to
contribute to greater afﬁliation of members to the MHI scheme and, thus, enhance revenue
generation as well as the achievement of the government’s desire to move closer to universal
health coverage.
The mechanism offers an interesting way of beneﬁting from the local presence of SHP and
MHI operators, while at the same time shifting higher risks from local MHI pools into a
nationwide pooling mechanism. Combining tax and insurance ﬁnancing, it offers a
“single-window” approach to the inclusion of vulnerable groups. This single-window
approach helps to overcome fragmentation in the health system resulting from multiple
single-purpose programmes. For example, the costs for obstetric care, the treatment of
chronic illnesses or HIV services can be reﬂected in the cost curve of the risk-adjusted
subsidy approach and, thus, be integrated into the beneﬁt package offered by the insurance
schemes. Inclusion of services for higher risk subgroups would greatly enhance equity in
access to health care. The ﬂat contribution rate would reduce the ﬁnancial burden of higher
risk groups without pricing those with lower risks out of the system.
Participation in the subsidy mechanism would require MHI operators to adhere to data
management and operational standards set by the Ministry of Health or the National
Social Health Protection Fund currently under consideration for the informal sector. The
risk-adjusted subsidy approach, unlike subsidies for actual health costs or administrative
Figure 6. A conceptual illustration of applying a subsidy with a ﬂat rate contribution.
21 The deﬁned subsidy would allow for national awareness campaigns jointly run by the Ministry of Health,
National Social Health Protection Fund and scheme operators.
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costs, is relatively easy to monitor and verify. Subsidy payments are based on easy-to-
verify parameters of insured members: their age, gender and location (i.e. the scheme
they are a member of). The subsidy is paid for the expected costs caused by each
member. The MHI scheme is responsible for managing its expenses, can retain any
surplus (as the schemes operate on a non-proﬁt basis, the surplus cannot be extracted and
is retained within the scheme), but also has to bear its own losses. This retains an
incentive for scheme managers to run efﬁcient operations, monitor health providers
closely and continue innovating on how to best deliver insurance to the informal sector.
Furthermore, as the administrative costs per insured decrease as more households are
covered, scheme operators will aim to cover as many households as possible, as this
increases the ﬁnancial viability of the insurance scheme, regardless of the subsidy.
The interest of scheme operators in maximising their insurance outreach is, therefore,
aligned with the government’s interest in having as many people covered as possible.
Such a ﬁxed ex ante subsidy approach, thus, increases efﬁciency in the health ﬁnancing
sector by (i) keeping the ﬁnancial responsibility for overall scheme performance with
scheme operators, (ii) retaining competition for lowest administrative costs through the
tendering of operational districts and (iii) keeping in place incentives to reduce
administrative costs even further through economies of scale.22
The continuous exchange of data between MHIs and the subsidy fund allows for the
dynamic adjustment of the subsidy formula based on the actual claim experience of
the various operators. This will increase the ﬁt of the subsidy formula over time and take
price developments in the health sector, as well as changes in the health-care supply side in
speciﬁc districts or provinces, into account. In the case of a large discrepancy between initial
cost estimations and actual costs incurred, for example, due to structural changes in the
health-care market in the course of a year, an ex post correction of the subsidy paid can be
considered.
Conclusion
The proposed mechanism is purely focused on the demand side and does not replace
efforts to improve the supply side. However, it would help in reducing the current
fragmentation of the SHP system by offering a “single-window” approach in order to
support access to health services by high-risk populations, thereby increasing equity in
access to care. If adopted, the approach would make a signiﬁcant contribution to achieving
the Government of Cambodia’s objective of universal health coverage in all three of its
dimensions, as it increases coverage of new segments of the population by offering an
inclusive approach at an attractive contribution rate; it increases the services accessible by
many people in the informal sector, which, due to their high risk proﬁle, they would not
otherwise be able to afford; and it reduces the direct costs for the user through a
combination of pooling insurance and tax funding at two levels, combining the advantages
22 For a general discussion on the efﬁciency aspects of risk adjustment see, for instance, Paolucci and Stoelwinder
(2011).
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of local stewardship of the insurance operations with the strength of pooling high(er) risks
at the national level.
Further, it is important to note that, while the focus of this paper has been on the MHI
members of SHP schemes, services for identiﬁed poor members could also fall under the risk
subsidy, with the remaining set contribution rate to be covered by a third party rather than the
poor household. If implemented, this would constitute another major step towards a fully
uniﬁed system.
Finally, whatever the approach eventually adopted by Cambodia in its attempt to achieve
universal health coverage, the mechanism outlined above has the potential to be used in
other, similar contexts with multiple and fragmented risk pools, as it offers both a suitable
technical solution for the extension of SHP coverage to new population groups and an
innovative mechanism that may be attractive to policymakers seeking to develop political
will as well as policy momentum for this expansion of coverage.
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